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In Roe v. Wade' the United States Supreme Court held that the
constitutional right of privacy guaranteed a woman the right, within
certain limits, to choose whether or not to have an abortion.2 Oppo-
nents of the right to abortion have undertaken, in part through legisla-
tion known as the Human Life Bill, 3 to change this ruling of the
Supreme Court. This effort to alter constitutional law, without follow-
* Lines Professor of Law Emeritus, Yale Law School. B.A. 1928, LL.B. 1931, Yale
University.
This Article is based upon a statement submitted to the Subcommittee on the Separation of
Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 Id. at 155.
3 The Human Life Bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator Helms of North Carolina as
S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). On July 9, 1981, the Bill was reported out of the Subcommit-
tee on the Separation of Powers, with minor amendments, by a two to one vote. The Human Life
Bill.- Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on Se.paration of owers of the Senate Comm on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1120 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Human Life Bill Hearings]. This
article discusses that portion of the Bill, as reported out by the Subcommittee, which provides:
SECTION 1. (a) The Congress finds that the life of each human being begins at concep-
tion.
(b) The Congress further finds that the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States protects all human beings.
SEC. 2. Upon the basis of these findings, and in the exercise of the powers of Congress,
including its power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, the Congress hereby recognizes that for the purpose of enforcing the obligation
of the States under the fourteenth amendment not to deprive persons of life without due
process of law, each human life exists from conception, without regard to race, sex, age,
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ing the procedure for constitutional amendment under article V,4 raises
several crucial questions which go to the heart of our constitutional
structure.
The proposed Human Life Bill seeks to overturn the decision in
Roe v. Wade by making two "findings of fact" and two declarations of
law. The first "finding" is that "the life of each human being begins at
conception," and the resulting declaration of law is that "for the pur-
pose of enforcing the obligation of the States under the fourteenth
amendment not to deprive persons of life without due process of law,
each human life exists from conception." 5 The second "finding" is that
"the fourteenth amendment. . . protects all human beings,' 6 and the
ensuing declaration of law is that the term "person" in the fourteenth
amendment "includes all human beings."'7 The declarations of law are
buttressed by the statement that Congress is hereby exercising "its
power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment,"8 a section which
gives Congress the authority "to enforce" that amendment "by appro-
priate legislation."9
The Human Life Bill raises several important constitutional issues,
having to do both with the legal effect of congressional "findings of
fact" and declarations of law and with the extent of congressional pow-
ers under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. A consideration of
the Bill thus poses at least three specific questions: (1) What is the ef-
fect of a congressional finding of fact that human life begins at concep-
tion? (2) What is the effect of a congressional declaration that a fetus is
a "person" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment? (3) Does
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment give Congress the power to
change the Supreme Court's interpretation of that amendment? This
Article will address each of these questions. In so doing, it will ex-
amine recent commentary by proponents of the Human Life Bill, con-
cluding not only that the Bill itself is unconstitutional, but also that the
theories proffered in its behalf pose a serious challenge to the structure
of our constitutional system.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT
The premise of the Human Life Bill is that "human life," or more
precisely a "human being," begins at conception. 10 This "human life,"
health, defect, or condition of dependency, and for this purpose 'person' includes all human
beings.
Id. at 1120-24.
4 U.S. CONST. art. 5.




9 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
10 Human Life BillHearings, supra note 3, at 1122. The second "finding"-that the fourteenth
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according to the theory of the Bill, is endowed with the attributes of a
human person, possessing a soul or at least entitled to the special status
accorded human beings in our society. Without this premise the legis-
lation would fall, for it would include in its protection all forms of life
equally, including animal and vegetable.
This finding, upon which the Human Life Bill is based, does not
rest upon any judgment subject to objective evaluation. All that empir-
ical judgment teaches us is that "life" exists in numerous forms, includ-
ing each individual cell, and that some of these have the genetic
potential for becoming human beings under some circumstances. The
precise point at which this biological form of life actually becomes a
"human being," however, is a theological or philosophical conclusion.
That judgment rests upon faith, religious dogma, or a fundamental
value at the basis of a philosophical system. For most of us, the ques-
tion of when human life begins is a matter of religious judgment.
There are, of course, many different views as to when human life is
created. Some groups hold to the position that human life exists in
each sperm and in each egg, and therefore that contraception destroys
life. Others believe that human life begins at conception, either when
the sperm first enters the egg or later, when it becomes firmly im-
planted. Others assert that human life begins when the fetus makes its
first movement, at the time of quickening. Others place the origin of
life at the point when the brain begins to function; still others when the
fetus can live outside the womb. Over the centuries, most people prob-
ably have thought that human life begins at the moment of birth. Yet
there are some who believe that life is never created, but merely passed
on from prior generations.
All of these varied positions have one common characteristic: they
are based not on empirically verifiable data, but upon faith, dogma, or
deeply held philosophical beliefs. Hence any attempt to determine the
issue of when life begins by making legislative "findings of fact" is
wholly wide of the mark. In any event, the question of when human
life begins is irrelevant to the constitutional issues raised in the inter-
pretation of the fourteenth amendment. This conclusion is apparent
from an analysis of Roe v. Wade, which sets forth the prevailing consti-
tutional law upon the subject. The rationale of that decision is summa-
rized in the following propositions:
(1) The constitutional "right of privacy" encompasses "a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.""
(2) This right "is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation."' 12 Since the right of privacy is a
amendment "protects all human beings" as defined-is on its face a conclusion of law, and is
considered in the next section of this Article. See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
11 410 U.S. at 153.
12 Id. at 154.
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"fundamental" right, 13 however, only a "compelling" state interest is
sufficient to overcome that right.14
(3) The state interests involved are twofold: the health of the
mother, 15 and the protection of "potential human life."' 16
(4) In weighing these interests, two conclusions are of crucial im-
portance:
(a) the fetus is not a "person" within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment;17
(b) the Supreme Court "need not resolve the diffi-
cult question of when life begins."' 18 Whatever "the-
ory of life" a state accepts, the state's interest to be
weighed against the individual's privacy interest is its
"interest in protecting the potentiality of human
life."19
(5) With respect to the state's interest in the health of the mother,
"the 'compelling' point. . . is at approximately the end of the first tri-
mester. '20 As regards "the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability" 2 '-i.e., the "capabil-
ity of meaningful life outside the mother's womb."22 The Supreme
Court therefore concluded that, "[i]n view of all this, we do not agree
that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of
the pregnant woman that are at stake. 23
In an article published in the Human Life Review, 24 Stephen H.
Galebach argues that, by refusing to decide when human life begins,
the Supreme Court left open the question of whether "Fourteenth
Amendment protection logically extends to unborn children;" 25 that
the reason for this omission on the part of the Court was because "the
judiciary has no suitable evidentiary standards to determine an an-
swer;" 26 and that "[t]he result of Roe v. Wade would have been entirely
different. . . if any branch of government had been able constitution-
ally to examine when life begins and to resolve the question in favor of
13 Id. at 152.
14 Id. at 155.
15 Id. at 162-63.
16 Id. at 162-64.
17 Id. at 156-62.
18 Id. at 159.
19 Id. at 162.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 163.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 162.
24 Galebach, A Human Lfe Statute, HUM. LIFE REv., Winter, 1981 at 5.
25 Id. at 6.
26 Id. at 7.
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unborn children." 27 Mr. Galebach is in error on all counts. As the
above extracts from Roe v. Wade demonstrate, the Court explicitly held
that the question of when human life begins is not relevant to the inter-
pretation of the fourteenth amendment.28 Moreover, the state interest
involved is the protection of "potential human life," a concept very dif-
ferent from the notion that the fetus per se is deserving of absolute
protection, in that the former invokes an image of immanent being
which is not yet in existence. Lastly, whatever theory of life is adopted
would not change the constitutional right of a woman to decide
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. In sum, a careful examina-
tion of Roe v. Wade makes clear that the findings incorporated in the
Human Life Bill are wholly incapable of altering the constitutional
protections enunciated in that decision.
THE DECLARATIONS OF LAW
The second major proposition of the Human Life Bill-that Con-
gress can change the Constitution by redefining the word "person" in
the fourteenth amendment29 -is also fallacious. The question of who
or what is a "person" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment
is plainly a matter of constitutional interpretation. For example, the
Supreme Court has held that a corporation is a "person" protected by
the fourteenth amendment.30 Unless we are to overrule Marbury v.
Madison3' and nearly two centuries of constitutional precedent, issues
of constitutional law are to be decided by the judiciary, not the legisla-
tive branch of government. Hence a congressional finding or declara-
tion that an embryo or a fetus is a "person"' within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment cannot change existing law as enunciated by the
Supreme Court.
Any other rule would mean an end to the whole constitutional
structure of separation of powers. Surely Congress could not by major-
ity vote overturn Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward32 by find-
ing that a charter was not a "contract"; or overturn Goldberg v. Kelly 33
by finding that the right to welfare benefits was not "property"; or over-
turn Pierce v. Society of Sisters34 by finding that the right of parents to
send their children to private school was not a "liberty"; or overturn
Brown v. Board of Education35 by finding that black children were not
27 Id. at 6-7.
28 See supra text accompanying note 18.
29 See supra note 3.
30 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
31 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
32 4 Wheat. 518 (1819).
33 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
34 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
35 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reargued on issue of relief, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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"persons". Unless we are prepared to jettison our traditional system of
separate governmental powers, such decisions must be made by the
Supreme Court.
JUDICIAL REACTION TO ATTEMPTS TO OVERRULE ROE V. W..DE
THROUGH LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS OF FACT AND
DECLARATIONS OF LAW
The Human Life Bill does not represent the first time that an at-
tempt has been made to circumvent Roe v. Wade by the device of mak-
ing legislative findings or declarations of the type embodied in the
Human Life Bill. Several such efforts have resulted in anti-abortion
legislation on the state level. This legislation has been consistently in-
validated by the courts.
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade, a Connecti-
cut anti-abortion statute36 was held unconstitutional by a three judge
district court, Judge Clarie dissenting.37 The Connecticut legislature
then reenacted the statute, leaving its substantive provisions essentially
unchanged, but adding the following declaration: "The public policy
of the state and the intent of the legislature is to protect and preserve
human life from the moment of conception. '38 The new Connecticut
statute did not explicitly say that the embryo or fetus was a "person"
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Yet the statute's ba-
sic declaration was the same as that in the Human Life Bill-that
human life begins at the moment of conception.
Opponents of the Connecticut statute immediately filed a further
suit in the same district court. The court-still prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade-declared that the new Connecticut
statute was also unconstitutional, Judge Clarie again dissenting.3 9 The
State of Connecticut immediately appealed this decision to the
Supreme Court, at the same time filing a motion to expedite the ap-
peal.40 In its Motion and Statement of Jurisdiction, the State of Con-
necticut placed major emphasis upon the statute's declaration that
human life commences at the time of conception:
The primary reason why this appeal merits plenary consideration by
this Court is that this is believed to be the first case involving the constitu-
tional issue of abortion wherein an evidentiary record has been made.
36 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-30 (1975) (declared unconstitutional 1972).
37 Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 801 (D. Conn. 1972), on remandfrom 452 F.2d 1121 (2d
Cir. 1971), vacated, 410 U.S. 951 (1973), reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 940 (1973), aJ'd, 369 F. Supp. 807
(1973) (per curiam).
38 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-31a (1975) (declared unconstitutional 1972).
39 Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 232 (D. Conn. 1972), motion to expedite appeal denied,
409 U.S. 1073 (1972), vacated, 410 U.S. 951 (1973), reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 940 (1973), a'd, 369 F.
Supp. 807 (1973) (per curiam).
40 Markle v. Abele, 409 U.S. 1073 (1972) (motion to expedite appeal denied).
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The evidence unequivocally supports the legislative finding that human
life commences from the time a child is conceived. Under these circum-
stances, a very grave constitutional question is raised when such a law is
stricken on the basis given by the lower court.41
The Supreme Court did not act upon this appeal until after its
decision in Roe v. Wade. On February 26, 1973, the Court remanded
the case "for further consideration in light of Roe v. Wade."' 42 The
state of Connecticut then filed a petition for rehearing of the remand
order. In its petition, Connecticut again rested its case primarily upon
the argument that "[t]he evidence conclusively demonstrates that an
unborn child is an alive, separate and distinct human being from the
time the child is conceived." 43 The petition summarized this evidence
at length and concluded that the Court should "grant a rehearing of
these cases on the grounds of the compelling interest of their state gov-
ernment in protecting the natural right to live."44
On April 16, 1973, the Supreme Court denied Connecticut's peti-
tion for rehearing.45 The case was remanded to the district court, and
on April 26 that court held a further hearing. Connecticut reiterated
the position it had taken before the Supreme Court. On the same day,
the district court issued its decision, Judge Clarie no longer dissenting:
"Further consideration of this case in light of Roe v. Wade ...re-
quires the conclusion that Public Act No. 1 is unconstitutional."46
Thus the federal courts were squarely presented with issues identical to
those posed by the Human Life Bill. They directly rejected the attempt
to overrule Roe v. Wade by vote of the legislature. No further appeal
to the Supreme Court was undertaken.
The state of Rhode Island also attempted to adopt an anti-abor-
tion statute47 designed to overrule Roe v. Wade. Like the Hui.man Life
Bill, the Rhode Island statute declared that "human life and, in fact, a
person within the language and meaning of the fourteenth amendment
to the constitution of the United States, commences to exist at the in-
stant of conception .... -48 A district court had no difficulty in hold-
ing this statute invalid, finding that the claim of constitutionality for the
new statute was "frivolous" and "essentially fictitious". 49 The court
stated:
It is sheer sophistry to argue as the defendant does that Roe v. Wade
41 Motion and Statement of Jurisdiction at 17.
42 Markle v. Abele, 410 U.S. 951 (1973).
43 Petition for Rehearing at 2.
44 "d. at 54.
45 Markle v. Abele, 411 U.S. 940 (1973).
46 Abele v. Markle, 369 F. Supp. 807, 809 (D. Conn. 1973).
47 R-I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-3-I to -5 (1973) (declared unconstitutional 1973).
48 Doe v. Israel, 358 F. Supp. 1193, 1195 n.1 (D.R.I.), staypending appealdenied, 482 F.2d 156
(1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974) (quoting RI. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-3-i to -5 (1973)).
49 Id. at 1199.
77:129 (1982)
HeinOnline -- 77 Nw. U. L. Rev.  135 1982-1983
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
. . . can be nullified by the simple device of a legislative declaration or
presumptions contrary to the court's holding. Indeed it is a surprising
attempt by one independent branch of government to invade and assume
the role of the other.50
The state of Rhode Island then applied to the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit for a stay pending appeal. That court,
addressing itself to the merits, denied the request for a stay, saying:
"We regard plaintiffs' expectation of prevailing on the merits so clear
that we see no purpose in discussing other issues sought to be raised by
the defendant." 51 The Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari.52
Similar claims, resting on findings that human life begins at the mo-
ment of conception and that a fetus is a "person" within the fourteenth
amendment, were made and rejected in Missouri and Louisiana.53
While it is true that these cases involved state statutes, not a fed-
eral statute, the constitutional issues decided in them were essentially
the same as those raised by the Human Life Bill. In these cases the
courts held that (1) a legislative finding that human life begins at the
moment of conception is irrelevant to the constitutional issue, and
(2) the question of whether a fetus is a person within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment is a matter of constitutional interpretation for
the courts, not for a legislative body. The Supreme Court has consist-
ently refused to review these decisions.
SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Although the federal courts have repeatedly dealt with the consti-
tutional issues presented by anti-abortion legislation, the Galebach ar-
ticle ignores the above cases.54 Galebach argues at length, however,
that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment authorizes Congress to
overturn Roe v. Wade through the findings and declarations embodied
in the Human Life Bill. Section 5 provides that "Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this arti-
cle."'55 On its face, the Human Life Bill clearly does not "enforce" the
provisions of the fourteenth amendment, but instead drastically alters
them, and thereby deprives millions of citizens of rights to which the
Supreme Court has held they are entitled. That section 5 was intended
to achieve any such result is inconceivable.
50 Id. at 1201-02.
51 Doe v. Israel, 482 F.2d 156, 159 (1st Cir. 1973).
52 Doe v. Israel, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
53 See Rosen v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 380 F. Supp. 875, 877 (E.D. La. 1974),
on remandfrom 412 U.S. 902 (1973); Rodgers v. Danforth, Civ. Action No. 18360-2 (W.D. Mo.
May 18, 1973), aft'd, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973).
5' Galebach, supra note 24. Galebach does cite Abele v. Markle on another issue. Id. at 29-
30 & n.lll.
55 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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Galebach's argument begins with the assumption that, if Congress
decides that human life exists from conception, then it "follows logi-
cally" that "unborn children" are "persons" within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment.56 Yet it does not "follow logically" that, be-
cause a single cell is "human life," or, more properly, "potential human
life," such cell is a "person" within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. The Supreme Court has, of course, held otherwise.5 7 In-
deed, Galebach concedes that his position "collides with the Supreme
Court's holding in Roe v. Wade," 58 and hence "raises serious constitu-
tional questions." 59 He is compelled, therefore, to proceed to his main
contention, which is that Congress has power under section 5 to "apply
...Fourteenth Amendment terms in ways that differ from and even
contradict Supreme Court interpretations. '60
This position is fatally flawed. The power granted Congress in
section 5 is the power to "enforce"-to implement, to provide remedies
for-the rights protected by the fourteenth amendment, not to change
or diminish those rights as they have been interpreted by the courts.
The presence of section 5 in the fourteenth amendment is explained by
the fact that Congress performs a function very different from that per-
formed by the courts in securing fourteenth amendment rights. The
function of the courts is to state what those rights are and to give them
effect through judicial procedures. The power of the courts to enforce
the provisions of the fourteenth amendment is thus limited to the "self-
executing" features of the amendment. Congress, on the other hand,
has wider powers of implementation. It can appropriate funds, estab-
lish police and prosecuting machinery, create administrative proce-
dures, and undertake comprehensive fact-finding to probe the depths of
a problem and to seek the best solutions. In this sense, Congress has
powers which go beyond those of the courts, and the courts will uphold
the exercise of those powers. But Congress cannot reject, or "contra-
dict," the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourteenth amendment,
much less take away constitutional rights the courts have held to exist.
Galebach consistently fails to make this crucial distinction be-
tween the powers of the courts and the powers of the legislature in the
enforcement of the fourteenth amendment. He would thus give Con-
gress the power to "contradict" the Supreme Court. The outcome
would work a revolution in our constitutional structure. Moreover, the
cases cited by Galebach do not support his position. On the contrary,
those are fully consistent with the traditional view of the constitutional
structure set forth above.
56 Galebach, supra note 24, at 10.
57 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 156-59.
58 Galebach, supra note 24, at 10.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 10-11.
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In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,61 the Supreme Court upheld a
provision of the Voting Rights Act of 196562 which abolished literacy
tests in all states and counties where less than fifty percent of the vot-
ing-age residents had voted in prior elections. 63 Previously the Court
had held that, while literacy tests were capable of being employed in a
discriminatory fashion, they did not necessarily violate the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment or the right-to-vote guaran-
tee of the fifteenth amendment. 64 The Voting Rights Act thus
substituted a general prohibition, in certain areas, for a case-by-case
adjudication as to whether a literacy test had resulted in an abridge-
ment of the right to vote. The Court ruled that, since Congress had
found individual adjudication to be "inadequate to combat widespread
and persistent discrimination in voting, ' 65 the new remedy was an "ap-
propriate means of combatting the evil."' 66 Oregon v. Mitchell67 upheld
the congressional suspension of literacy tests on a nation-wide basis
under the same reasoning.68 In neither case did the legislature "contra-
dict" the previous ruling of the Supreme Court. Instead, Congress was
operating within the framework of the Supreme Court's determination
that literacy tests could violate the fourteenth amendment, and was
simply supplying a more effective remedy than the courts could
provide.
Galebach's main reliance is on Katzenbach v. Morgan.69 In that
case, the Supreme Court dealt with section 4(e) of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, which stipulated that no person who had successfully com-
pleted the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school could be denied the
right to vote in any election because of inability to read or write Eng-
lish.70 In a companion case,71 the Court declined to hold that a New
York statute requiring literacy in English was a violation of the "self-
executing" provisions of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.72 Nevertheless, the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan up-
held Section 4(e) under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.73 Jus-
tice Brennan, writing for the majority, placed primary reliance upon an
61 383 U.S. 301 (1966), citedin Galebach, supra note 24, at 11, 13, 19, 22.
62 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974 (1981).
63 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337.
64 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
65 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328.
66 Id.
67 400 U.S. 112 (1970), cited in Galebach, supra note 24, at 13, 14, 18, 19.
68 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 131-34.
69 384 U.S. 641 (1966), cited in Galebach, supra note 24, at 12-18, 21, 22, 24.
70 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1981).
71 Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672 (1966).
72 Although the Supreme Court did not pass on the issue, the equal protection issue was
clearly presented in the case. See Cardona v. Power, 16 N.Y.2d 639, 640, 209 N.E.2d 119, 120,
(1965). See also Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. at 659, 676.
73 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652.
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analogy to the "necessary and proper clause."' 74 Section 4(e), he said,
"may be viewed as a measure to secure for the Puerto Rican commu-
nity residing in New York nondiscriminatory treatment by govern-
ment-both in the imposition of voting qualifications and the provision
or administration of governmental services, such as public schools,
public housing and law enforcement. '7 5 In other words, "enhanced
political power" resulting from the right to vote "will be helpful in
gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services for the entire
Puerto Rican community." 76 This theory, it is important to note, is a
purely remedial one. While it recognizes Congress's power to imple-
ment the fourteenth amendment, it does not recognize any congres-
sional power to reject or reinterpret the Supreme Court's decision as to
the meaning of the equal protection clause.
Justice Brennan went on to state, as a second ground for the deci-
sion, a proposition that is somewhat more ambiguous. He argued that
Congress, in its "general appraisal of literacy requirements for voting
.. . to which it brought a specially informed legislative competence," 77
might have had a basis for predicating a "judgment that the application
of New York's English literacy requirement. . . constituted an invidi-
ous discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 78
While there may be some basis for construing this language as recog-
nizing a congressional power to find a violation of the equal protection
clause where the Court had not, essentially Justice Brennan was simply
saying that the enhanced fact-finding capacity of Congress had un-
earthed a factual basis for discovering discrimination which was not
apparent to the Court when it considered the New York statute by it-
self. Certainly it is not conceivable that Justice Brennan meant to over-
turn constitutional history and to hold that section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment empowers Congress to reject the Supreme Court's author-
ity to determine the legal meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
In any event, Justice Brennan's language in Katzenbach v. Morgan
can give no comfort to the proponents of the Human Life Bill. Justice
Brennan made it entirely clear that his views on Congress's power
under section 5 did not authorize that body to abrogate the fourteenth
amendment rights of individuals as previously secured by Supreme
Court decisions. Using a footnote, apparently on the assumption that
the proposition was so obvious as not to require elaboration, he stated
that "Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to en-
force the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power
74 Id. at 650-53. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
75 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 655-56.
78 Id. at 656.
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to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees. ' 79 Since the Human
Life Bill would abrogate the constitutional rights of a large group of
citizens, Justice Brennan's opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan has no ap-
plication here. Galebach asserts that the Human Life Bill "would exert
a collateral effect on the right to privacy, but it would not abrogate or
infringe that right as the Supreme Court has interpreted it. ' ' 80 This
statement is disingenuous. The Bill is intended to remove present four-
teenth amendment privacy protections, namely the right of a woman to
terminate a pregnancy.
Further support for the above interpretation of Justice Brennan's
Katzenbach v. Morgan opinion can be found in Oregon v. Mitchell.8' In
addition to upholding the ban on literacy tests, this case dealt with pro-
visions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 which prohibited
denial of the vote to citizens who had reached the age of eighteen.8 2
The Supreme Court, by a five to four vote, upheld the statute as ap-
plied to federal elections but found it invalid as applied to state elec-
tions.83 A majority of the Court thus ruled that section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment did not empower Congress to find that with-
holding the right to vote from eighteen-year-olds constituted a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause. 84 In a dissenting opinion, joined by
two other Justices, Justice Brennan argued that Congress could "under-
take an investigation in order to determine whether the factual basis
necessary to support a state legislative discrimination actually exists"
and, if it did not find such a factual basis, Congress could "remove the
discrimination by appropriate means. ' 85 It seems clear that Justice
Brennan was thinking in terms of a factual determination by Congress
as to whether discrimination existed, not in terms of a legal determina-
tion of what forms of discrimination were prohibited by the equal pro-
tection clause. Furthermore, Justice Brennan reiterated, again in a
footnote, his previous statement that section 5 "does not grant Congress
power to . . .enact 'statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection
and due process decisions of this Court.' "86 Thus it is highly inappro-
priate for advocates of the Human Life Bill to cite Justice Brennan's
Katzenbach v. Morgan opinion in support of their position.
Galebach also relies heavily upon the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in City of Rome v. United States.87 This case concerned
the validity of a provision in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which pro-
79 Id. at 651 n.10.
80 Galebach, supra note 24, at 24.
81 400 U.S. at 112. See supra text accompanying note 67.
82 42 U.S.C. § 1973bb (1981).
83 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 119-31.
84 Id. at 126-30.
85 Id. at 248.
86 Id. at 249 n.31 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10).
87 446 U.S. 156 (1980), citedin Galebach, supra note 24, at 14, 15, 18, 19, 22.
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hibited changes in the electoral structure of a city without prior ap-
proval of the United States Attorney General, when the purpose or
effect of the change would be to deny or abridge the right to vote on
account of race.88 There was no evidence that the purpose of the
change in City of Rome was to deny or abridge voting rights, but there
was evidence that such was the effect. 89 The Court, assuming that the
"self-executing" features of the fifteenth amendment would invalidate
only purposeful discrimination, nevertheless held that the prohibition
based upon effect was valid under section 2 of the fifteenth amend-
ment. 90 Galebach cites this decision as an example of Supreme Court
approval of Congress's authority to alter rights under the fifteenth
amendment by virtue of its section 2 enforcement powers.91
The majority opinion in City of Rome, however, was meticulously
framed to make it clear that the statute did nothing more than imple-
ment the rights created by section 1 of the fifteenth amendment. The
Supreme Court never suggested that section 2 authorized Congress to
create new rights or alter existing rights under the fifteenth amendment.
The core of the decision was stated as follows:
Congress could rationally have concluded that, because electoral
changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial
discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it
was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact....
We find no reason, then, to disturb Congress' considered judgment that
banning electoral changes that have a discriminatory impact is an effec-
tive method of preventing States from "undo[ing] or defeat[ing] the rights
recently won by Negroes."'92
It is thus clear that the Supreme Court has no intention of straying
from the principle that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment grants
only remedial or implementing powers to Congress, and was never in-
tended to confer upon Congress the power to initiate substantive
changes in the basic rights secured by the fourteenth amendment.
It might be argued that the Human Life Bill undertakes to protect
the interests of the fetus and in that sense expands, rather than con-
tracts, the substantive rights granted by the fourteenth amendment.
There are two dispositive objections to this position. Since the fetus is
not a "person' within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment-as
the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade-it does not possess any four-
teenth amendment rights to balance off against the right of the woman
88 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a-1973c (1981).
89 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. at 183-86.
90 Id. at 177.
91 Galebach, supra note 24, at 14, 15. Section 2, like section 5 of the fourteenth amendment,
authorizes Congress to "enforce the Amendment by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend.
XV, § 2.
92 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. at 177-78 (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S.
130, 140 (1976)) (citations omitted).
77:129 (1982)
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choosing to have an abortion. Moreover, even if the fetus were consid-
ered to have fourteenth amendment rights, Congress would have no
power to declare that the fetus's rights have priority in the face of a
contrary holding by the Supreme Court. Were Congress able to exert
such power, it could also, for example, overrule Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation93 by asserting that racial segregation in the public schools is con-
stitutional because the right of association overcomes the right to equal
protection of the laws. Clearly such an authority cannot be supported
within our system of separate governmental powers.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional implications of the Human Life Bill are omi-
nous. The devices embodied in that legislation-the finding of pseudo
fact, the assertion of the ultimate power to declare what the Constitu-
tion means, and the use of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to
change substantive rights-completely undermine the historic powers
of the courts to protect our system of individual rights against legisla-
tive encroachment.
93 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reargued on issue of relief, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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